Everything here is his own text: 54 dated documents, 168,085 words, as at 2026-08-28. Nothing written about him is in the corpus - not analyst notes, not profiles, not market commentary. The reason is narrow: a persona distilled from what the market thinks he will do would teach the model the consensus, which is the exact inverse of why this machine exists. hard data
| Date | Era | Document | What it establishes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2008-05-21 | governor | The Federal Funds Rate in Extraordinary Times | The two priors that never change: avoid the error of false precision about the neutral rate, and treat being too easy for too long as the expensive mistake, because it forces a correction 'at great cost'. |
| 2008-11-06 | governor | The Promise and Peril of the New Financial Architecture | A central bank should resist playing a larger role than its statute or economics warrants, and should sometimes accept 'the perils of popularity' and decline to act. |
| 2009-04-06 | governor | The Panic of 2008 | Policy should encourage differentiation among firms rather than treat them alike - the intellectual root of his later absolute anti-bailout position. |
| 2010-03-26 | governor | An Ode to Independence | An early, unqualified defence of central bank independence, written before he began arguing that mandate creep is what destroys it. |
| 2010-11-08 | governor | Rejecting the Requiem | Expanding the balance sheet 'is not a free option': as it grows the Fed becomes 'more of a price maker than a price taker' in the Treasury market and obscures price signals about US indebtedness. |
| 2010-11-08 | governor | The New Malaise and How to End It (op-ed) | Published the same day as the speech above and days after he voted for QE2 - 'the Federal Reserve is not a repair shop for broken fiscal, trade or regulatory policies'. The single clearest instance of his words running ahead of his vote. |
| 2011-02-10 | governor | Letter of Resignation | How he resolves a disagreement he has lost: he did not dissent, he complied, published, and left. Load-bearing for predicting that he will not break a committee to register a view. |
| 2011-12-06 | private | The 'Financial Repression' Trap | Government-induced prices send false signals to users and providers of capital; market-determined prices reveal inconvenient truths sooner. |
| 2014-01-01 | private | Rethinking Macro: Reassessing Micro-Foundations | A long-form statement of his methodological scepticism about the macro toolkit, four years before it becomes a reform programme. |
| 2016-03-08 | private | Challenging the Groupthink of the Guild | No model should be determinative of policy, 'not even the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models pushed so prominently by our guild'; institutions lose credibility by overpromising and under-delivering. |
| 2016-05-03 | private | Decision-Making at the Fed | His template for how the Committee should deliberate - the earliest draft of the process changes he made in June 2026. |
| 2016-08-24 | private | The Federal Reserve Needs New Thinking | A Jackson Hole-week op-ed calling for institutional reform of the Fed, exactly ten years before he delivered the Jackson Hole keynote as Chairman. |
| 2019-05-03 | private | Tying Down the Anchor: The Task Gets Tougher | With ammunition low, credibility is 'at a premium' and will be relied on most when the economy slows - the asymmetry that makes him structurally hawkish even when he sounds calm. |
| 2022-03-01 | private | Reinvigorating Economic Governance | His longest single document: a governance blueprint arguing that agencies which stray beyond their statutory core forfeit the independence they claim. |
| 2025-04-25 | private | Commanding Heights: Central Banks at a Crossroads | He owns and regrets QE2 in his own words, and states the distinctive position that independence is instrumental rather than sacred - the objective is 'to make the central bank safe for democracy, not to make democracy safe for the central bank'. |
| 2025-07-08 | private | Inflation Is A Choice (full interview transcript) | The title thesis in extended form: inflation is an accountability question for the central bank, not a weather event - which is why he will not accept supply-shock excuses as Chairman. |
| 2026-04-21 | nominee | Opening Statement before the Senate Banking Committee | The compressed platform he took into office: 'Inflation is a choice, and the Fed must take responsibility.' |
| 2026-04-21 | nominee | Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Banking Committee | Three commitments made under oath and kept: he does not believe in forward guidance; the interest-rate tool is the dominant and fairer one, the balance sheet secondary; and the statutory floor of four meetings a year is 'not enough'. |
| 2026-06-17 | chair | FOMC Statement (12-0) | The first statement of his chairmanship: forward guidance and the easing bias deleted, the text cut from 341 words to 131, the named 'Voting for' roster abolished. Unanimous. |
| 2026-06-17 | chair | Transcript of the FOMC Press Conference | The 2 percent target is fixed and not up for review until delivered; he submitted no dot of his own; five task forces announced; policy described as unevenly restrictive - tight in housing, not in financial markets. |
| 2026-07-14 | chair | Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress | No tolerance for persistently elevated inflation, and an explicit refusal to bank on AI: 'We don't know the extent to which the economy will benefit from the AI buildout.' Also the anti-bailout line, 'full stop'. |
| 2026-07-29 | chair | FOMC Statement (9-3) | Three hawkish dissents for a 25bp hike - reported as the first time since September 2016 that three policymakers dissented in the same direction. Statement closes: 'The Committee will deliver price stability.' |
| 2026-07-29 | chair | Transcript of the FOMC Press Conference | The only explicit statement of his reaction function, and it contains no numbers. Also the two sentences the simulator later built a whole scenario on: markets 'have tightened financial conditions in this intermeeting period', and dissent is 'the design feature'. |
| 2026-08-19 | chair | Minutes of the July 28-29 FOMC meeting | The Committee is split on the same question he is: some participants judged financial conditions not sufficiently restrictive, various participants judged that they had tightened. Several favoured a 25bp increase; many judged tightening would be necessary if inflation did not decline. |
| 2026-08-28 | chair | In Our Time (Jackson Hole keynote) | His hundredth day as Chairman and his first extended prepared text in the job: routine forward guidance retired ('just don't call it forward guidance'), responsibility for '65 months of sustained, elevated inflation' assigned squarely to the central bank, and - against his own simulator's assumption - 'hard pressed to describe broad financial conditions as restrictive'. |
A card that resolved the contradiction would predict beautifully and be wrong at exactly the moments that matter - the meetings where the office-holder and the essayist disagree. judgement
Keeping it open costs precision on every ordinary meeting and buys honesty on the rare ones.
| Date | The position, and his own words |
|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | The 2 percent PCE target is fixed and not up for review until it has been delivered.I see no reason until we have reestablished our commitment and ability to deliver on the 2 percent inflation objective to revisit that. |
| 2026-06-17 | Routine forward guidance is gone, and he submitted no projection of his own.We've dropped forward guidance. ... I can't give any forward guidance about what we're going to do next. |
| 2026-07-29 | His stated reaction function has no numbers in it: with employment near equilibrium, the direction of underlying inflation decides the direction of policy.Any central banker, when he or she sees underlying inflation moving higher, he or she is more inclined to tighten policy. Again, when you've achieved the other side of your mandate, and you see underlying inflation falling, he's more inclined to loosen policy. That's my reaction function. |
| 2026-07-29 | He read the intermeeting rise in market rates as evidence that transmission works - a claim about the Fed's capability, not a reason to wait.If you look broadly at market prices, they are certainly not saying all clear, but they are working in concert to keep us on our toes, and they have tightened financial conditions in this intermeeting period, and that has provided us some comfort that we've got the ability and capability to deliver. |
| 2026-07-29 | Dissent is designed in, not suppressed - and he refuses to call the hold a pause.I asked for a good family fight, and I got one. That's the purpose, that's the design feature. |
| 2026-08-28 | He does not judge broad financial conditions to be restrictive, and explicitly puts the sectors that are strained outside that judgment. This is a level judgment he has held consistently since June.Certain sectors-like housing and agriculture-are showing strains. But, on balance, I would be hard pressed to describe broad financial conditions as restrictive. |
| 2026-08-28 | Responsibility for the overshoot belongs to the central bank, and he counts it in months rather than describing it in adjectives.There is one signal nobody can miss: The responsibility for 65 months of sustained, elevated inflation sits squarely with the central bank. And that is where it belongs. |
| 2026-04-21 | On meeting frequency he is on record - before taking office - that the statutory floor of four meetings a year is too few. No target number has ever come from him, and the widely circulated '8 to 4' framing is contradicted by his own words.I believe the statute requires a minimum of four meetings, but four is not enough. So having more meetings than that is appropriate. |